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It has become fashionable, even for Supreme 
Court Just ices, to talk about workload. As District and 
Court of Appeals Judges know as much about this subject as 
we do - perhaps a good deal more in some respects - I will 
try to be restrained in what I say on the subject. 
At the ABA meeting in San Francisco last summer, 
Byron White, John Stevens and I independently and 
without foreknowledge of the other talks - each ~ 
suggested ~ - Since then, Just ices Brennan and 
O'Connor also have joined in. 
The Chief Justice's Proposal 
At the ABA February meeting the Chief Justice 
made a specific recommendation. Thou~ this audience is 
2. 
familiar with it, I think the proposal merits a brief 





temporary special ~ t associated with the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Feder al Circuit. Its members 
would be drawn from a panel made up of two judges from 
..s 
each of the 13 Circui ~ , a total panel of 26. In turn, 
~O"\ kA-.J2.. 
th is court would sit in panels of, say, f=4ve to ..iP"fl'A 
members drawn from the larger panel. Its membership would 
V 
rotate at relatively short inter~als so that its members 
would not be in Washington for extended periods of time. 
I note parenthetically that if my wife Jo is 
typical, the spouses of judges serving on the special 
court would find the cultural advantages - and the beauty 
of the city - a pleasant interlude, provided - of course -





'j f"'"'-·• ~ I c_ouY-1 ~ 
- The r;urisdiction would be defined, probably 
limited to resolving conflicts among the Circuits. It is 
estimated that this would relieve the Supreme Court of 
?,S°" S-0 
perhaps ~ to ~ argued cases each Term. 
k,. ~ ~;, k iticrcitt ] .J.. -n..-.~~ ~~,~---..;._~- ,v 
benefit my Court. 
~ 
be,7-,,,, 4t _,_ 
This would ne-t, 
1 
In view of the 
complexity and difficulty of the 183 argued cases this 
Term, we cannot - in my opinion - give each of them the 
meticulous care and consideration that they merit. 
for today, 
If the Cour7'nnounces the decisions scheduled 
this will leave us with more than ~ .J,_~ 
argued cases not yet disposed of. The crunch for the 
remainder of the Term is likely to result in opinions of 
inferior quality, even though the judgments will have been 
maturely considered. This tends also to increase the 
t::.A-.. Uu... ~ j-,nL-~ .tn-L f ~~JI L •' ,~ 





necessity to resolve circuit conflicts, therefore, would 
be welcomed. 
A further benefit of the Chief Justice's 
suggestion is that conflicts among the Circuits probably 
would be resolved more promptly. Often we decline to take 
a case where the conflict is new, and we think it may be 
resolved at the Circuit Court level. We also have a self-
serving phrase: We characterize a conflict as "tolerable" 
-Jfor the time being. This leaves doubt as to what the 
law is, and produces additional litigation. 
My understanding is that a bill has been 
introduced in the Judiciary Committees, though I have not 
read it. There are problems, of course, including a 
definition of what constitutes a "Circuit conflict". But 
I would not think these are insoluble. 
5. 
I therefore support the Chief Justice's 
proposal. It is experimental. It would not - except in 
the most limited sense - create another tier of federal 
0 
courts/\ ; he special 
Circuit Court Judges, 
would be created. 
Bureaucratized? 
court would be composed only of 
and no ad{ministrative bureaucracy 
So much for the Chief Justice's proposal. In my 
talk last summer I addressed primarily the question 
whether the litigation explosion threatens the judging 
function with being bureacratized. I do not think it 
fair}to say at this time that judging has reached this 
unhappy state. 1 
1see articles by Judge Rubin, Judge Edwards 
and Professor Vini~ +Mark· add cites) .......-'Z-_ 
L--.,.., Rvt ~11 Bvre.o.vc .. x~-f i1t"f;61t 0-f -Ht~ .f-t}er4/ Cov .1;: 
ft.., r u.'s; u ~ Bd r,1U-I( ✓ II di a ,wJ E-FF, <1-o/ ) )!:"" 
Nofrt. b""'<- uwyt.r 6'/Y (1,to)) £Jc,10.vJs A- jvJJ~'; V,'t.w 
0~ J vi tic l>v~ua.,c..r4c q,,.t( le_ 4 Mt../'1 J' fO ft, d.. L. 
Rt.v. 2s1 c,,r,) j Vi1ti1tJ Iv~ ,'~c. Bv-rt.q_11'c.n~cr A.kl L~,,, 
f\14..--fLJ fl) '4,,../ l b~tl ~- </.t 1(/'/11\ I 
6. 
I believe that the great majority of judges 
(state and federal) personally perform the essential 
~c_a--~---t.~ ~ 
judging functionl\. \conscientiously. Typically, they work 
longer hours, with shorter real vacations, e4he 
busy practitioner. I estimated recently that for ten 
months in the year, I average at least 60 hours per week. 
This is considerably more than my chargeable hours ever 
were at the peak of a large and demanding law practice. 
Justices of my Court do have a respite in July and August, 
but even then most of us try to keep roughly abreast of 
the cert petitions and commence reading briefs for the new 
Term. 
bf v;(0;"~'l 
Professor Howard~ has estimated that "the cost of 
legal services 
productr more 
accounts for 2% of America's gross national 
than J::e entire steel industry" ~ e 
-3) 
_ V • • L, n:rdl"" 
Ito ~wJ 
1 
,t ~{so c. 1 dy ~ .I W i Is ll '1 
(rva.rftr-~) )v11llft-r /11/J f. ~8. 
7. 
expressed concern about the extent to which we are a 
"litigious" society. This needs no documentation to an 
audience of judges and lawyers. Civil filings in U.S. 
District Courts totaled 206,193 cases for the year ended 
June 30, 1982, a 14.2% increase over the prior year. 
If this rate of increase continues, I have no 
doubt that the quality of judging will deteriorate -
whether one characterizes it as bureaucratized or not. 
Simply creating additional judges - while no doubt helpful 
- will not solve the basic problem resulting from this 
5 
rush of lawyer and litigants to resolve all sorts of 
A 
rights and claims in court. 
The Fundamental Need 
As I stated in my talk to the Division of 
Judicial Administration last August, "the fundamental need 
8. 
-,-( «-- J, d t'; c.f 
is to reduce the rate of flow of cases into g , ~. Qistt l e ~ 
> L -fuLttAl/ 
J..c..• / ourts". f This flow burdens the entir~ ystem. Action by 
Congress, long overdue, could go far to transfer much of 
this litigation to state courts, many of which are not 
overburdened. 
Almost 50,000 of the cases filed in District 
Court last year (ended June 30) were based on diversity 
jurisdiction - nearly 25% of total filings. As Erwin 
Griswold recently has said, this jurisdiction is an 
"anachronism" of the federal system.P '/ As a practicing 
lawyer, I welcomed the option of diversity jurisdiction! 
and the bar generally still opposes its elimination. I 
r ~r:wi8 ~  Griswold, Brendan F. Brown 
University tychool) ~ I vw, March 23, 
. Lof frit(.ViU\ ~IN 
7, fXJ • [A..YrJ <- JXJ~ 
",t.,e_ ~L felu_a . .J Lc>vv-h 8ec.01e1 ~,, 
, i A . B . A . J . I 5 70 1 I 3 7 / ( l'I t 2..) ,, 
.K11re...q 11t-rtt-cJ u; 
• 
~ 0 & fsy. v,, -f (o .,,'J e, ~ fu-11 J~.a f U11 i vw1J , JV' F i.f 
'fOO (ot":r 1if t) (01 t.a1t <) re: v',I _} t( . ~ . 9. 
~ f'i82 "\ ~~ c,~<;.c., 0~ '11 v... I U-1 1 
~ 
A~'H2 <I. ""--t.Y S fe« fo p<«"" •'.J ,._,1) t.J I /.e,.S S ,.,,f;-_ 
<..q I\ t!] " '-' vr':) t<( ., l_'f 83 "l ,:J.. d -/1..s- c., l V I / Y ~ I. fl ~, h )"--/it, 
most ~wyers, however, when they understand 
that the quality and balance of our system of justice is 
at issue, will accept this necessary changer 
As you know from what I have said previously at 
our Conferences, I consider the abuse of §1983 to be 
intolerable. Some 16,000 state prisoner §1983 suits were f 
C:: I 
filed in the past year. The number increases eactpear. ,.:..J 
Congress should at least require exhuastion of state 
~ ~~ c;,rcv~ r 
remedies - as~ held in a constructive opinion by Judge 
6 
Roney. ~ I must acknowledge that courts, and particularly 
the Supreme Court, are primarily responsible for 
tf(~·,okS t4J kl\v(. f.u{ ~ ;fs 
nh11nr Fl .Jo fflinnn ... of §198 3{ (lt,,k._J... tt\isV.1(. 
the 
etL,..s.e. 
I also have mentioned here that appropriate 
~ "A'1a k, Cite C:als9u Add a) so that the 
t t of rsi988 in 197 ~ has signifieantly encouraged eco a c m9 n ' • · t · 
§...1983, as well es other ci~il rigbts, l1t1ga ion 
10. 
congressional action is needed to curb repetitive recourse 
to federal habeas corpus jurisdict ion to review state 
court criminal convictions. In my view, §2254 review 
should be limited to cases of manifest in just ice, where 
the issue is guilt or innocence. 
Eliminating diversity jurisdiction, requiring 
exhaustion of state remedies in §1983 prisoner cases, and 
limiting § 2254 review to cases of possible substantive 
in just ice~ could substantially reduce the flow of cases 
. -t:.ler1,I -n l(.. JA r« iovrce..s erF .r;.l-e.Ytf.. ( J1 vriJ-
1nto the system. f#\t 1 "' , . a, F 
/1 d,c..J;"" UJI\Sh Iv~ k~ct.,'J Vo '7o , 
Other Reforms A. (( e{ I ~>h ,c.f c_ovYf- c.,.,,( ti I 1 "Jf, 
There is reason to believe that pressures at the ,,, 
Courts of Appeals, at least ,t most Circuits, are as 
demanding as those at the Supreme Court. Modification of 
federal court jurisdiction, as has been suggested, would 
11. 
materially benefit all federal courts. An additional 
reform at the Court of Appeals level that merits serious 
consideration is authorizing discretionary review of 
District Court judgments in most cases. 
a~ 
I also think, as e€~en has been suggested, that 
additional specialized courts should be created. I know 
of no reason why it would not be desirable to have a 
United States Court of Tax Appeals the decisions of which 
would be final.,) with limited exceptions. Professor 
Griswold has suggested a United States Court of Criminal 
Appeals, with jurisdiction to review appeals from state 
courts in criminal cases and decisions of federal District 
Courts in habeas corpus proceedings. There are precedents 
for specialized courts. They have obvious advantages that 
12. 
the addition of more judges to the traditional federal 
courts simply do not offer. 
In sum, though all of the foregoing are ~ 
familiar suggestions, it seems to me that each has 
sufficient merit to justify thoughtful and L~~fi~ 
consideration by the organizations of our profession, ~ 
by the Judicial Conference) fe~ y by Congress. 
Capital Cases 
As capital cases accumulate, they add a new 
dimension to the problem of repetitive litigation. I will 
..,. ~~;( -address this only in the most conclusory terms. Gregg;\ 
decided that capital punishment is constitutional. Some 
37 states have authorized it. Murders continue, many of 
incredible cruelty and brutality, as mindless killings 
13. 
increase in much of the world. We now have more than 
1,000 convicted persons on death row, an intolerable 
situation. 
-Fi "(._ 
Many of these persons were convicted ~ and -s,x 
~ e years ago. Their cases of repetitive review move 
sluggishly through our dual system. We have found no 
effective way to assure careful and fair and yet 
expeditious and final review. 
So far this Term, we have granted and heard 
arguments in four capital cases, and have agreed to hear a 
fifth next Term. We have received 28 applications for 
stay of execution, about half of which have come at the 
eleventh hour. 
The most recent example is the Evans case from 
MtUV W"'Zll 




one seriously suggested his innocence or that under 
existing 
sentence. 
law capital punishment was 
.l 1f 
Resourceful counsel, t.h:tQQ 
not a merited 
111 Ote. -h S, 
«Rel a half 'Y'ears 
after federal habeas seemed to have been exhausted, sought 
a stay of execution from me as Circuit Justice. Filing 
the application was delayed for two months after Evans' 
motion for a new sentencing hearing was denied. Filed 
late on April 19, it reached my Chambers on the morning of 
the 20th, 40 hours before scheduled execution time. 
With the concurrence of six others members of 
the Court, I denied the application at 5:45 p.m., on April 
21. ~tAr1l~t:~1~''t!01 ~ i=~k~~ ¥~~1; ~ Aw - and with no 
notice to us, the same counsel filed a new petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the 
Southern District of Alabama. urported to 
(t\·.1tL ~"""fAOV~ 
.. ~JS (C.l• ,.J ·~ 
j tt.~ f''.°' "'a .. r, 
t yo<-~ LJ '" j ," 
°'l~o 
15. 
identify "new" grounds. This belated filing occurred less 
than seven hours before scheduled execution time. After 
careful consideration by all nine of us, we granted the 
state's application to dissolve and vacate the stay. 
Counsel offered no explanation for the timing of 
these applications. 
I was reminded of the statement of a panel of 
your Court in Brooks v. Francis, in the Per Curiam opinion 
of January 12 , 1983. (fr 7 
"Once again • • • a panel of this Court is 
confronted at the eleventh hour with numerous 
and extensive papers submitting an application 
for a stay of execution. • • The members of 
the panel have put aside all other court 
business and have sought to address the 
application, motions, supporting memoranda, 
responses, and more fulsome documents 
theretofore submitted to the District Court." 
1 • AThe panel was composed of Judges Hill, 
Kravitch and Henderson. 
16. 
Perhaps counsel should not be criticized for 
taking every advantage of a system that irrationally 
permits the now familiar abuse of process. The primary 
fault likes with our permissive system, that both Congress 
and the courts tolerate. 
Apart from the need for 
~ f ~~ 
legislation :limit'i-ng 
/\ 
~ ~--.-e. ~ µ.-:.,~ u-~~~ 
abusQ --G-f §2254, I make only modest suggestions that lie 
A 
within the discretion of state and federal courts. In 
?z,Hv to 4-J;iZL, y. ~-· 
view of the reasonable certainty of recourseJ ~ ollateral 
review, capital cases could well be put on an accelerated 
schedule of appellate consideration within the state 
system. ~imilari ~ federal courts could do likewise. I 
-::. 
noted that your panel in Brooks v. Francis, after granting 
a stay, directed the clerk to "expedite the appeal". 
17. 
Another step is illusrated by the commendable 
admonition to counsel, by Judge Hand ~ f the Southern 
District of Alabama, in the first §2254 review in the 




• (Hark. here quote rrom his admonit!ion ...l)-. 
It also may be desirable to require that 
s£., 
counsel, when applications for stays of execution seem to 
,f M,k5 be filed belatedly, support the application with a sworn 
l\\eM«') explanation of the reasons for the delay, and that such 
OJJ. reasons be included in the record to inform appellate 




judges in the event of review. 
* * * 
I do not wish to be misunderstood. No lawyer or 
judge would suggest a rush "to judgment" in capital cases. 
_y 
18. 
As our opinions have made clear, no higher duty exists in 
the judging process than to exercise meticulous care where 
the sentence may be or is, death. It is one thing, 
however, to exercise this sort of care, and quite another 
to permit the process of repetitive review to draw out for 
year 0 eview of issues that have, or should have been, 
reviewed earlier. 
This malfunctioning of our system of justice is 
unfair to the hundreds of persons confined anxiously on 
death row. It also disserves the public interest in the 
implementation of lawful sentences. Moreover, it 
undermines public confidence in our system of justice and 
the will and ability of the courts of administer it. 
/~,•ezc .a.di "4<. ~ ~-e, ~ ~ 
Unless ~ move effectively to address this problem, the ~ 
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
It has become fashionable, even for Supreme 
Court Justices, to talk about workload. As District and 
Court of Appeals Judges know as much about this subject as 
we do - perhaps a good deal more in some respects - I will 
try to be restrained in what I say on the subject. 
At the ABA meeting in San Francisco last summer, 
Byron White, John Stevens and I independently and 
without foreknowledge of the other talks - each suggested 
reforms. Since then, Justices Brennan and O'Connor also 
have joined in. 
The Chief Justice's Proposal 
At the ABA February meeting the Chief Justice 
made a specific recommendation. Though this audience is 
familiar with it, I think the proposal merits a brief 
discussion. An Act of Congress would establish a 
temporary special court associated with the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Its members 
would be drawn from a panel made up of two judges from 
2. 
each of the 13 Circuits, a total panel of 26. In turn, 
this court would sit in panels of, say, seven or nine 
members drawn from the larger panel. Its membership would 
rotate at relatively short intervals so that its members 
would not be in Washington for extended periods of time. 
I note parenthetically that if my wife Jo is 
typical, the spouses of judges serving on the special 
court would find the cultural advantages - and the beauty 
of the city - a pleasant interlude, provided - of course -
they were free to join their judges. 
The special court's jurisdiction would be 
defined, probably limited to resolving conflicts among the 
Circuits. It is estimated that this would relieve the 
Supreme Court of perhaps 35 to 50 argued cases each Term. 
This would be a significant benefit to my Court. In view 
of the complexity and difficulty of the 183 argued cases 
this Term, we cannot - in my opinion - give each of them 
the meticulous care and consideration that they merit. 
Today, the 9th of May, we have more than a 
hundred argued cases not yet disposed of. The crunch for 
the remainder of the Term is likely to result in opinions 
of inferior quality, even though the judgments will have 
been maturely considered. This tends also to increase the 
3. 
amount of separate writing by Justices, as the time for 
working out differences will be limited. Eliminating the 
necessity to resolve circuit conflicts, therefore, would 
be welcomed. 
A further benefit of the Chief Justice's 
suggestion is that conflicts among the Circuits probably 
would be resolved more promptly. Often we decline to take 
a case where the conflict is new, and we think it may be 
resolved at the Circuit Court level. We also have a self-
serving phrase: We characterize a conflict as "tolerable" 
- for the time being. This leaves doubt as to what the 
law is, and produces additional litigation. 
My understanding is that a bill has been 
introduced in the Judiciary Committees, though I have not 
read it. There are problems, of course, including a 
definition of what constitutes a "Circuit conflict". But 
I would not think these are insoluble. 
I therefore support the Chief Justice's 
proposal. It is experimental. It would not - except in 
the most limited sense - create another tier of federal 
courts. The special court would be composed only of 
Circuit Court Judges, and no administrative bureaucracy 
would be created. 
4. 
Bureaucratized? 
So much for the Chief Justice's proposal. In my 
talk last summer I addressed primarily the question 
whether the litigation explosion threatens the judging 
function with being bureacrat ized. I do not think it 
fair to say at this time that judging has reached this 
unhappy state. 1 
I believe that the great majority of judges 
(state and federal) personally perform the essential 
judging functions and do so conscientiously. Typically, 
they work longer hours, with shorter real vacations, than 
even the busy practitioner. I estimated recently that for 
ten months in the year, I average at least 60 hours per 
week. ~his is considerably more than my chargeable hours 
ever were at the peak of a large and demanding law 
practice. Justices of my Court do have a respite in July 
and August, but even then most of us try to keep roughly 
1see articles by Judge Rubin, Judge Edwards 
and Professor Vining: Rubin, Bureaucratization of the 
Federal Court: The Tension Between Justice and 
Efficiency, 55 Notre Dame Lawyer 648 (1980); Edwards, A 
Judge's View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 
Mich. L. Rev. 259 (1981); Vining, Justice Bureaucracy, and 
Legal Method, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 248 (1981). 
5. 
abreast of the cert petitions and commence reading briefs 
for the new Term. 
Professor Howard of Virginia has estimated that 
"the cost of legal services accounts for 2% of America's 
gross national product, more than the entire steel 
industry". 2 He expressed concern about the extent to 
which we are a "litigious" society. This needs no 
documentation to an audience of judges and lawyers. Civil 
filings in U.S. District Courts totaled 206,193 cases for 
the year ended June 30, 1982, a 14.2% increase over the 
prior year. 
If this rate of increase continues, I have no 
doubt that the quality of judging will deteriorate -
whether one characterizes it as bureaucratized or not. 
Simply creating additional judges - while no doubt helpful 
- will not solve the basic problem resulting from this 
rush of lawyers and litigants to resolve all sorts of 
rights and claims in court. 
The Fundamental Need 
As I stated in my talk to the Division of 
2Howard, A Litigation 
Quarterly, Summer 1981, p. 98. 
Society?, Wilson 
6. 
Judicial Administration last August, "the fundamental need 
is to reduce the rate of flow of cases into the district 
courts." 3 This flow burdens the entire system. Action by 
Congress, long overdue, could go far to transfer much of 
this litigation to state courts, many of which are not 
overburdened. 
Almost 50,000 of the cases filed in District 
Court last year (ended June 30) were based on diversity 
jurisdiction - nearly 25% of total filings. As Erwin 
Griswold recently has said, this jurisdiction is an 
"anachronism" of the federal system. 4 As a practicing 
lawyer, I welcomed the option of diversity jurisdiction, 
and the bar generally still opposes its elimination. I 
believe that most lawyers, however, when they understand 
that the quality and balance of our system of justice is 
at issue, will accept this necessary change. 
As you know from what I have said previously at 
our Conferences, I consider the abuse of § 198 3 to be 
3"Are the Federal Courts Becoming 
Bureaucracies?" 68 A.B.A.J. 1370, 1371 (1982). 
Griswold, Brendan F. Brown Lecture, 
Catholic University of America Law School, March 23, 1983, 
p. 14. 
7. 
intolerable. Some 16,000 state prisoner §1983 suits were 
filed in the past year. The number increases each year. 5 
Congress should at least require exhuastion of state 
remedies - as the Fifth Circuit held in a constructive 
opinion by Judge Roney. 6 I must acknowledge that courts, 
and particularly the Supreme Court, are primarily 
responsible for the extensions of §1983 that have led to 
its abuse and misuse. 
I also have mentioned here that appropriate 
congressional action is needed to curb repetitive recourse 
to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review state 
court er iminal convict ions. In my view, §2254 review 
should be limited to cases of manifest injustice, where 
the issue is guilt or innocence. 
Eliminating diversity jurisdiction, requiring 
5The enactment of 42 u.s.c. ~1988, 
authorizing attorneys's fees to prevailing parties, has 
significantly encouraged §1983 and other civil rights 
litigation6 Pats Florida International Universit , 
634 F.2d 9 CA anc , rev , ___ u .. 
(1982). As I have noted previously, the statute ena-cfed 
by Congress in 1978, 42 u.s.c. §1997e, "is a hedged and 
limited requirement for prior exhaustion and to date has 
been wholly ineffectual." "Are the Federal Courts 
Becoming Bureaucracies?" 68 A.B.A.J. 1370, 1371 (1982). 
8. 
exhaustion of state remedies in §1983 prisoner cases, and 
limiting S2254 review to cases of possible substantive 
injustice, could substantially reduce the flow of cases 
into the federal system. These three sources of federal 
jurisdiction constitute nearly 40% of all district court 
civil filings. 
Other Reforms 
There is reason to believe that pressures at the 
Court of Appeals level, at least in most Circuits, are as 
demanding as those at the Supreme Court. Modification of 
federal court jurisdiction, as has been suggested, would 
materially benefit all federal courts. An additional 
reform at the Court of Appeals level that merits serious 
consideration is authorizing discretionary review of 
District Court judgments in most cases. 
I also think, as often has been suggested, that 
additional specialized courts should be created. I know 
of no reason why it would not be desirable to have a 
United States Court of Tax Appeals the decisions of which 
would be final, with limited exceptions. Professor 
Griswold has suggested a United States Court of Criminal 
Appeals, with jurisdiction to review appeals from state 
courts in criminal cases and decisions of federal District 
9. 
Courts in habeas corpus proceedings. There are precedents 
for specialized courts. They have obvious advantages that 
the addition of more judges to the traditional federal 
courts simply do not offer. 
In sum, though all of the foregoing are familiar 
suggestions, it seems to me that each has sufficient merit 
to justify thoughtful and prompt consideration by the 
organizations of our profession, by 
Conference, and certainly by Congress. 
Capital Cases 
the Judicial 
As capital cases accumulate, they add a new 
dimension to the problem of repetitive litigation. I will 
address this only in the most conclusory terms. Gregg v. 
Georgia decided that capital punishment is constitutional. 
Some 37 states have authorized it. Murders continue, many 
of incredible cruelty and brutality, as mindless killings 
increase in much of the world. We now have more than 




Many of these persons were convicted five and 
ago. Their cases of repetitive review move 
through our dual system. We have found no 
10. 
effective way to assure careful and fair and yet 
expeditious and final review. 
So far this Term, we have granted and heard 
arguments in four capital cases, and have agreed to hear a 
fifth next Term. we have received 28 applications for 
stays of execution, about half of which have come at the 
eleventh hour. 
The most recent example is the Evans case from 
Alabama. Evans was found guilty and sentenced to die in 
1977. No one seriously suggested his innocence or that 
under existing law capital punishment was not a merited 
sentence. Resourceful counsel, six months after federal 
habeas seemed to have been exhausted, sought a stay of 
execution from me as Circuit Justice. Filing of the 
application was delayed for two months after Evans' 
motion for a new sentencing hearing was denied. Filed 
late on April 19, it reached my Chambers on the morning of 
the 20th, 40 hours before scheduled execution time. 
With the concurrence of six others members of 
the Court, I denied the application at 5:45 p.m., on April 
21. Approximately twenty minutes later, and with no 
notice to us, the same counsel filed a new petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the 
11. 
Southern District of Alabama. The petition raised 
numerous grounds resolved in the prior habeas proceedings, 
and also purported to identify "new" grounds. This 
belated filing occurred less than seven hours before 
scheduled execution time. After careful consideration by 
all nine of us, we granted the state's application to 
dissolve and vacate the stay. 
Counsel offered no explanation for the timing of 
these applications. 
I was reminded of the statement of a panel of 
your Court in Brooks v. Francis, in the Per Curiam opinion 
of January 12, 1983. 7 
"Once again • • • a panel of this court is 
confronted at the eleventh hour with numerous 
and extensive papers submitting an application 
for a stay of the execution of the death 
penalty. The members of the panel have put 
aside all other court business and have sought 
to address the application, motions, supporting 
memoranda, responses, and more fulsome documents 
theretofore submitted to the district court." 
Perhaps counsel should not be criticized for 
taking every advantage of a system that irrationally 
7The panel was composed of Judges Hill, 
Kravitch and Henderson. 
12. 
permits the now fami 1 iar abuse of process. The primary 
fault likes with our permissive system, that both Congress 
and the courts tolerate. 
Apart from the need for legislation that would 
inhibit unlimited filings under §2254, I make only modest 
suggestions that lie within the discretion of state and 
federal courts. In view of the reasonable certainty of 
recourse both to state and federal collateral review, 
capital cases could well be put on an accelerated schedule 
of appellate consideration - particularly within the state 
system. I noted that your panel in Brooks v. Francis, 
after granting a stay, properly directed the clerk to 
"expedite the appeal". 
Courts themselves often contribute to the 
slowness of the process. When a prisoner is on death row, 
his interest - as well as that of the state - demands that 
judges at all levels expedite their consideration and 
decision of capital cases. 
Another constructive step is illusrated by the 
commendable admonition to counsel, by Judge Hand of the 
Southern District of Alabama, in the first §2254 review 
in the Evans case. He insisted that counsel identify 
explicitly "each and every ground ••• that can be 
13. 
asserted to attack the constitutionality of the 
Alabama death statute or the incarceration of John Louis 
Evans III. If co4nsel declines to follow [this order] 
they will thereby be presumed to have deliberately 
waived the rights to any such proceedings on any such 
actions in the future." 8 
It also may be desirable to require that 
counsel, when applications for stays of execution seem to 
be filed belatedly, support the application with a sworn 
explanation of the reasons for the delay, and that such 
reasons be included in the record to inform appellate 
judges in the event of review. 
* * * 
I do not wish to be misunderstood. No lawyer or 
judge would suggest a rush "to judgment" in capital cases. 
As our opinions have made clear, no higher duty exists in 
the judging process than to exercise meticulous care where 
the sentence may be, or is, death. It is one thing, 
8unpublished order of April 20, 1979 
(reprinted in App. 55, Hopper v. Evans, O.T. 1981, 80-
1714). 
14. 
however, to exercise this sort of care, and quite another 
to permit the process of repetitive review to draw out for 
years the resolution of issues that have, or should have 
been, resolved earlier. 
This malfunctioning of our system of justice is 
unfair to the hundreds of persons confined anxiously on 
death row. It also disserves the public interest in the 
implementation of lawful sentences. Moreover, it 
undermines public confidence in our system of justice and 
the wi 11 and abi 1 i ty of the courts to administer it. 
Unless the courts - and Congress - discharge their 
respective duty to move effectively to address this 
problem, the legislatures of the several states should 
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It has become fashionable, even for Supreme Court Jus-
tices, to talk about workload. As District and Court of Ap-
peals Judges know as much about this subject as we do-per-
haps a good deal more in some respects-I will try to be 
restrained in what I say on the subject. 
At the ABA meeting in San Francisco last summer, Byron 
White, John Stevens and I-independently and without 
foreknowledge of the other talks-each suggested reforms. 
Since then, Justices Brennan and O'Connor also have joined 
in. 
The Chief Justice's Proposal 
At the ABA February meeting the Chief Justice made a 
specific recommendation. Though this audience is familiar 
with it, I think the proposal merits a brief discussion. An 
Act of Congress would establish a temporary special court as-
- sociated with the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. Its members would be drawn from a panel 
made up of two judges from each of the 13 Circuits, a total 
panel of 26. In turn, this court would sit in panels of, say, 
seven or nine members drawn from the larger panel. Its 
membership would rotate at relatively short intervals so that 
its members would not be in Washington for extended peri-
ods of time. 
I note parenthetically that if my wife Jo is typical, the 
spouses of judges serving on the special court would find the 
cultural advantages-and the beauty of the city-a pleasant 
interlude, provided-of course-they were free to join their 
judges. 
The special court's jurisdiction would be defined, probably 
limited to resolving conflicts among the Circuits. It is esti-
mated that this would relieve the Supreme Court of perhaps 
35 to 50 argued cases each Term. This would be a significant 
benefit to my Court. In view of the complexity and diffi-
culty of the 183 argued cases this Term, we cannot-in my 
opinion-give each of them the meticulous care and consider-
ation that they merit. 
Today, the 9th of May, we have more than a hundred ar-
gued cases not yet disposed of. The crunch for the remain-
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der of the Term is likely to result in opinions of inferior qual-
ity, even though the judgments will have been maturely 
considered. This tends also to increase the amount of sepa-
rate writing by Justices, as the time for working out differ-
ences will be limited. Eliminating the necessity to resolve 
circuit conflicts, therefore, would be welcomed. 
A further benefit of the Chief Justice's suggestion is that 
conflicts among the Circuits probably would be resolved more 
promptly. Often we decline to take a case where the con-
flict is new, and we think it may be resolved at the Circuit 
Court level. We also have a self-serving phrase: We charac-
terize a conflict as "tolerable"-for the time being. This 
leaves doubt as to what the law is, and produces additional 
litigation. 
My understanding is that a bill has been introduced in the 
_ Judiciary Committees, though I have not read it. There are 
problems, of course, including a definition of what consti-
tutes a "Circuit conflict". But I would not think these are 
insoluble. 
I therefore support the Chief Justice's proposal. It is 
experimental. It would not-except in the most limited 
sense------ereate another tier of federal courts. The special 
court would be composed only of Circuit Judges, and no ad-
ministrative bureaucracy would be created. 
Bureaucratized? 
So much for the Chief Justice's proposal. In my talk last 
summer I addressed primarily the question whether the liti-
gation explosion threatens the judging function with being 
bureacratized. I do not think it fair to say at this time that 
judging has reached this unhappy state. 1 
1 See articles by Judge Rubin, Judge Edwards and Professor Vining: 
Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Court: The Tension Between Jus-
tice and Efficiency, 55 Notre Drune Lawyer 648 (1980); Edwards, A 
Judge's View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 Mich. L. 
Rev. 259 (1981); Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 Mich. 
L. Rev. 248 (1981). 
.~ 
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I believe that the great majority of judges (state and fed-
eral) personally perform the essential judging functions and 
do so conscientiously. Typically, they work longer hours, 
with shorter real vacations, than even the busy practitioner. 
I estimated recently that for ten months in the year, I aver-
age at least 60 hours per week. This is considerably more 
than my chargeable hours ever were at the peak of a large 
and demanding law practice. Justices of my Court do have a 
respite in July and August, but even then most of us try to 
keep roughly abreast of the cert petitions and commence 
reading briefs for the new Term. 
Professor Howard of Virginia has estimated that "the cost 
of legal services accounts for 2% of America's gross national 
product, more than the entire steel industry". 2 He ex-
pressed concern about the extent to which we are a "liti-
gious" society. This needs no documentation to an audience 
· of judges and lawyers. Civil filings in U. S. District Courts 
totaled 206,193 cases for the year ended June 30, 1982, a 
14.2% increase over the prior year. 
If this rate of increase continues, I have no doubt that the 
quality of judging will deteriorate-whether one character-
izes it as bureaucratized or not. Simply creating additional 
judges-while no doubt helpful-will not solve the basic 
problem resulting from this rush of lawyers and litigants to 
resolve all sorts of rights and claims in court. 
The Fundamental Need 
As I stated in my talk to the Division of Judicial Adminis-
tration last August, "the fundamental need is to reduce the 
rate of flow of cases into the district courts." 3 This flow 
burdens the entire system. Action by Congress, long over-
-due, could go far to transfer much of this litigation to state 
courts, many of which are not overburdened. 
2 Howard, A Litigation Society?, Wilson Quarterly, Summer 1981, p. 
98. 
'
3 Are the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies? 68 A.B.A.J. 1370, 
1371 (1982). 
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Almost 50,000 of the cases filed in District Court last year 
(ended June 30) were based on diversity jurisdiction-nearly 
25% of total filings. As Erwin Griswold recently has said, 
this jurisdiction is an "anachronism" of the federal system. 4 
As a practicing lawyer, I welcomed the option of diversity ju-
risdiction, and the bar generally still opposes its elimination. 
I believe that most lawyers, however, when they understand 
that the quality and balance of our system of justice is at 
issue, will accept this necessary change. 
As you know from what I have said previously at our Con-
ferences, I consider the abuse of § 1983 to be intolerable. 
Some 16,000 state prisoner§ 1983 suits were filed in the past 
year. The number increases each year. 5 Congress should 
at least require exhuastion of state remedies-as the Fifth 
Circuit held in a constructive opinion by Judge Roney. 6 I 
must acknowledge that courts, and particularly the Supreme 
Court, are primarily responsible for the extensions of § 1983 
that have led to its abuse and misuse. 
I also have mentioned here that appropriate congressional 
action is needed to curb repetitive recourse to federal habeas 
corpus jurisdiction to review state court criminal convictions. 
In my view, § 2254 review should be limited to cases of mani-
fest injustice, where the issue is guilt or innocence. 
Eliminating diversity jurisdiction, requiring exhaustion of 
state remedies in § 1983 prisoner cases, and limiting § 2254 
review to cases of possible substantive injustice, could sub-
stantially reduce the flow of cases into the federal system. 
'Griswold, Brendan F. Brown Lecture, Catholic University of America 
Law School, March 23, 1983, p. 14. 
5 The enactment of 42 U. S. C. § 1988, authorizing attorneys's fees to 
prevailing parties, has significantly encouraged § 1983 and other civil 
rights litigation. 
• Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F. 2d 900 (CA5 1981) 
(en bane), rev'd, -- U. S. -- (1982). As I have noted previously, the 
statute enacted by Congress in 1978, 42 U. S. C. § 1997e, "is a hedged and 
limited requirement for prior exhaustion and to date has been wholly inef-
fectual." Are the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies? 68 A.B.A.J. 
1370, 1371 (1982). 
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These three sources of federal jurisdiction constitute nearly 
40% of all district court civil filings. 
Other Reforms 
There is reason to believe that pressures at the Court of 
Appeals level, at least in most Circuits, are as demanding as 
those at the Supreme Court. Modification of federal court 
jurisdiction, as has been suggested, would materially benefit 
all federal courts. An additional reform at the Court of Ap-
peals level that merits serious consideration is authorizing 
discretionary review of District Court judgments in most 
cases. 
I also think, as often has been suggested, that additional 
specialized courts should be created. I know of no reason 
why it would not be desirable to have a United States Court 
of Tax Appeals the decisions of which would be final, with 
. limited exceptions. Professor Griswold has suggested a 
United States Court of Criminal Appeals, with jurisdiction to 
review appeals from state courts in criminal cases and deci-
sions of federal District Courts in habeas corpus proceedings. 
There are precedents for specialized courts. They have ob-
vious advantages that the addition of more judges to the tra-
ditional federal courts simply do not offer. 
In sum, though all of the foregoing are familiar sugges-
tions, it seems to me that each has sufficient merit to justify 
thoughtful and prompt consideration by the organizations of 
our profession, by the Judicial Conference, and certainly by 
Congress. 
Capital Cases 
As capital cases accumulate, they add a new dimension to 
the problem of repetitive litigation. I will address this only 
in the most conclusory terms. Gregg v. Georgia decided that 
capital punishment is constitutional. Some 37 states have 
authorized it. Murders continue, many of incredible cruelty 
and brutality, as mindless killings increase in much of the 
world. We now have more than 1,000 convicted persons on 
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death row, an intolerable situation. 
Many of these persons were convicted five and six years 
ago. Their cases of repetitive review move sluggishly 
through our dual system. We have found no effective way to 
assure careful and fair and yet expeditious and final review. 
So far this Term, we have granted and heard arguments in 
four capital cases, and have agreed to hear a fifth next Term. 
We have received 28 applications for stays of execution, 
about half of which have come at the eleventh hour. 
The most recent example is the Evans case from Alabama. 
Evans was found guilty and sentenced to die in 1977. No 
one seriously suggested his innocence or that under existing 
law capital punishment was not a merited sentence. Re-
sourceful counsel, six months after federal habeas seemed to 
have been exhausted, sought a stay of execution from me as 
Circuit Justice. Filing of the application was delayed for 
two months after Evans' motion for a new sentencing hearing 
was denied. Filed late on April 19, it reached my Chambers 
on the morning of the 20th, 40 hours before scheduled execu-
tion time. 
With the concurrence of six others members of the Court, I 
denied the application at 5:45 p.m., on April 21. Approxi-
mately twenty minutes later, and with no notice to us, the 
same counsel filed a new petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. 
The petition raised numerous grounds resolved in the prior 
habeas proceedings, and also purported to identify "new" 
grounds. This belated filing occurred less than seven hours 
before scheduled execution time. After careful consider-
ation by all nine of us, we granted the state's application to 
dissolve and vacate the stay. 
Counsel offered no explanation for the timing of these 
applications. 
I was reminded of the statement of a panel of your Court in 
Brooks v. Francis, in the Per Curiam opinion of January 12, 
1983.7 
7 The panel was composed of Judges Hill, Kravitch, and Henderson. 
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"Once again . . . a panel of this court is confronted at the 
eleventh hour with numerous and extensive papers sub-
mitting an application for a stay of the execution of the 
death penalty. The members of the panel have put 
aside all other court business and have sought to address 
the application, motions, supporting memoranda, re-
sponses, and more fulsome documents heretofore sub-
mitted to the district court." 
Perhaps counsel should not be criticized for taking every 
advantage of a system that irrationally permits the now 
familiar abuse of process. The primary fault lies with our 
permissive system, that both Congress and the courts 
tolerate. 
Apart from the need for legislation that would inhibit un-
limited filings under § 2254, I make only modest suggestions 
that -lie within the discretion of state and federal court;s. In 
view of the reasonable certainty of recourse both to state and 
federal collateral review, capital cases could well be put on an 
accelerated schedule of appellate consideration-particularly 
within the state system. I noted that your panel in Brooks 
v. Francis, after granting a stay, properly directed the clerk 
to "expedite the appeal." 
Courts themselves often contribute to the slowness of the 
process. When a prisoner is on death row, his interest-as 
well as that of the state-demands that judges at all levels 
expedite their consideration and decision of capital cases. 
Another constructive step is illusrated by the commend-
able admonition to counsel, by Judge Hand of the Southern 
District of Alabama, in the first § 2254 review in the Evans 
case. He insisted that counsel identify explicitly "each and 
every ground . . . that can be asserted . . . to attack the con-
stitutionality of the Alabama death statute or the incarcera-
tion of John Louis Evans III. If counsel ... declines to fol-
low [this order] ... they will thereby be presumed to have 
8 
deliberately waived the rights to any such proceedings on 
any such actions in the future." 8 
It also may be desirable to require that counsel, when 
applications for stays of execution seem to be filed belatedly, 
support the application with a sworn explanation of the rea-
sons for the delay, and that such reasons be included in the 
record to inform appellate judges in the event of review. 
I do not wish to be misunderstood. No lawyer or judge 
would suggest a rush "to judgment" in capital cases. As our 
opinions have made clear, no higher duty exists in the judg-
ing process than to exercise meticulous care where the sen-
tence may be, or is, death. It is one thing, however, to exer-
cise this sort of care, and quite another to permit the process 
of repetitive review to draw out for years the resolution of 
issues that have, or should have, been resolved earlier. 
This malfunctioning of our system of justice is unfair to the 
hundreds of persons confined anxiously on death row. It 
also disserves the public interest in the implementation of 
lawful sentences. Moreover, it undermines public confi-
dence in our system of justice and the will and ability of the 
courts to administer it. Unless the courts-and Congress-
discharge their respective duties to move effectively to ad-
dress this problem, the legislatures of the several states 
should abolish capital punishment. 
• Unpublished order of April 20, 1979 (reprinted in App. 55, Hopper v. 




No. 81-1453, South Dakota v. Neviiie 
Neville was arrested for drunken driving, and refused 
to submit to a blood alcohol test. He declared, "I'm too drunk; 
I won't pass the test." The state courts granted his motion to 
suppress all evidence of his refusal to submit. 
Nine state statutes permit the admissibility of the 
refusal to submit to a test, while five state stptutes prohibit 
it. The lower courts are terribly divided. In twenty cases, the 
courts have held that the refusal to submit can be admitted. In 
fifteen cases, the opposite result has been reached. Further-
more, the lower courts have analyzed the issue in many different 
ways. This Court left the question open in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966), but in five previous cases 
(going both ways) the Court has refused to grant cert on the is-
sue. There has been considerable secondary literature on the 
topic, and the prevention of drunk driving is finally receiving 
the national attention it deserves. 
It is not clear yet how the parties will present the 
issues here. The lower court relied on the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments. Schmerber held that compelled withdrawal of 
blood from a criminal defendant for chemical analysis is not tes-
timonial or communicative evidence, and thus not covered by the 
Fifth Amendment. Presumably that will be the starting point. 
:z. 
No. 81-1635, Anderson v. Celebrezze 
This case arose out of John Anderson's 1980 independent 
presidential campaign. Under Ohio law, an independent has to 
declare his/her candidacy approximately five months before a ma-
jor party candidate in order to secure a place on the ballot. 
The statute does not seem to make it difficult for minor party 
candidates as a general rule, but is devastating for candidates 
(like Anderson) who seek a party nomination before deciding to 
run as independents. The DC found a violation of the First 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. CA6 reversed, holding 
that Ohio's state interest (in helping its voters make informed 
choices) justifies the restrictions on ballot access. This Court 
will have to decide what is the appropriate standard of review, 
and then apply it. 
No. 81-1687, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios 
This is the famous "Betamax" case. CA9 held that home 
videotaping of free off-the-air television programming is a vio-
lation of the Copyrights Act, and that the manufacturers of VTR 
machines are liable for contributory infringement. Petrs argue 
that home videotaping is "fair use" of a copyrighted work, and 
that, in any event, the manufacturers are not liable for the use 
made of their VTRs by third parties. Congress is also consider-
ing this question, so there is a real possibility that the case 
will be moot before the Court hears it. 
job 10/16/82 
Simopoulos v. Virginia, No. 81-85 
Simopoulos is one of three cases that presents several issues 
implicating the right to an abortion. The one issue common to all 
is whether the state can constitutionally require all second 
trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital. Because very few 
hospitals perform abortions, and even fewer perform second trimester 
abortions, the practical effect of such a requirement is to make the 
abortion more expensive, both in terms of money and of time, for the 
woman. 
The cases also raise several other important abortion issues: 
(1) whether a state may require that the doctor personally give some 
prescribed information to a patient that is considering whether to 
have an abortion; (2) whether states may require some period of 
delay (24 hours at issue here) between the giving of that 
information and the abortion; (3) whether states can require minors 
to get either parental approval or court approval before having an -abortion; (4) how far the state may regulate disposal and 
examination of the fetus following an abortion. 
1422-~~ 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Your clerks 
Re: Cases which might be discussed at Washington and Lee 
No. 81-1832, Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
The INS determined to suspend the deportation of Chadha, a 
Kenyan whose visa had expired, because deportation would result in 
extreme hardship. The Immigration and Nationality Act requires that 
the INS's decision to suspend deportation must be submitted to 
Congress and that either house may veto the INS's decision, which 
the House did. Two issues are presented. The S is whether the 
use of the one house veto violates the Presentation Clause, which 
requires that bills be passed by both houses and presented to the 
President. The argument for Chadha on this point is that the 
agency's action represents an implementation of the policy contained 
in the original grant of power to the agency. The use of the veto 
allows Congress to change the policy embodied in the original bill 
without going through the strict procedural requirements (passage by 
both houses and approval by the President) that the framers found 
necessary to channel Congress' power. The response given by 
Congress is that they have merely conditioned the original grant of 
power to the agency. Exercise of the veto does not upset the 
allocation of power that was contained in the ori inal bill. 
2. 
The e ond3 is whether the exercise of the veto 
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. On this point, 
Chadha argues that in approving or disapproving the INS's action, 
Congress is exercising adjudicatory or administrative power. It was 
precisely to prevent Congress' combining these powers with its own 
legislative power that the doctrine of separation of powers was 
adopted. The response by Congress is that separ a tion of powers is a 
flexible doctrine, whose primary purpose is to c h eck the accretion 
of power in one branch. Not to allow the legislative veto would 
inhibit Congress' ability to control the vast power that ------ - ---....,_._..., ~ __,. . ::..----
administrative agencies presently enjoy and frus t rate the purpose of _________ , __________ _ 
checking power that the doctrine implies. 
No. 81-1863, United States v. Grace (5/L-f-~ ~) 
40 u.S.C.§13k prohibits the "display [of] ... any flag, 
banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice 
any party, organization or movement" in the Supreme Court building 
or on its grounds. The Marshall has interpreted this regulation to 
ban any picketing. This case arose when two ret i red missionaries 
wanted to picket on the Supreme Court grounds to expose injustice in 
Latin America. After they were told by Marshall Wong to leave, they 
returned with placards that had the First Amendment written on them. 
Grayned v. City of Rockford indicates that the approach in 
public forum cases is generally to consider whether the speech 
3. 
involved is basically incompatible with the normal activity of the 
area. Here, it is possible that the presence of picketts would be 
incompatible with the decorum of the Court and the Court's interest 
~
in avoiding the appearance that its decisions might be affected by 
One complicating factor is that there is a 
statute that governs picketing at any federal courthouse. It -------
terms and prohibits picketing with "the intent ----
obstructing, or impeding the administration of 
justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, 
~ witness, or court officer, in the discharge of his duty." 18 u.s.c. 
§1507. It is possible to argue that the availability of this 
narrower statute indica t es that the statute applicable to the Court 
is overbroad. -----
One last question is the propriety of the Court's taking 
~ 
the case. The case, however, is on appeal from a federal court.~ 
u-t" ;'1,,1 ~-£.,t.~ 
No. 81-1945, Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resource Comm'n 
In 1976, California adopted a law that placed a moratorium 
on the construction of nuclear power plants in the state unless a -
permanent method of nuclear waste disposal was developed. The CA 
held that the Atomic Energy Act did not preempt state law. Even 
though the Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of radiation 
hazards associated with nuclear power, the CA found that this 
regulation did not fall into that category since it was concerned 
with the viability of nuclear power as an alternative fuel, not with 
the dangers associated with radiation. The CA based its holding on 
4. 
the determination that the "uncertainties in the nuclear fuel cycle 
make nuclear power an uneconomical and uncertain source of energy." 
The SG argues that the state law is preempted because 
California's concern here is clearly with radiation hazards and also 
because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of Congress' purpose. 
/ 
No. 82-23, Marsh v. Chambers 
For the past sixteen years, the Nebraska legislature has 
employed a chaplain to open each day's session with a prayer. The 
chaplain is paid out of state funds and is associated with a 
particular religious denomination. Prior to this law suit, the 
state published the chaplain's prayers in books and distruibuted the 
books at state expense. The CA found that the state policies, 
viewed as a whole, violate the establishment clause. They serve no 
secular purpose, have a primary effect of advancing one religious 
view, and entangle the state with religion. 
-- Prior to filing for cert, the state agreed to stop 
publishing and distributing the prayers at the state's expense. The 
remaining issue is limited to the legislature's employing a 
chaplain, who is tied to one denomination. 
No. 81-2335, Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington 
TRW is a nonprofit charitable and educational corporation 
that was formed to represent the general public on tax issues before 
Congress. Although TRW was otherwise qualified for a tax exemption 
as a charitable organization, the IRS denied it an exemption because 
5. 
of its lobbying activities. TRW claims that denying it a tax 
exemption violates the Equal Protection Clause since the IRC 
provides different treatment for veterans organizations, which both 
receive a charitable exemption and are able to lobby. The CADC 
followed Buckley v. Valeo in adopting a heightened level of scrutiny 
since the indirect effect on lobbying caused by the denial of a 
charitable exemption was similar to the indirect effect on access to 
the ballot in Buckley. 
The primary question is whether the government's interests 
in this case justify treating veterans differently. The SG argues 
that the unparalleled contributions made by the veterans to the 
government justify their being treated differently. Also, the close 
cooperation between veterans' groups and the government is unique. 
The CADC refused to consider these interests since Congress had not 
articulated them. 
_, 
.. . , 
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81-1 Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States 
81-3 Bob Jones v. United States 
These cases present the question whether the IRS has statu-
tory authorization to deny tax exemptions to racially-
d i scriminatory private schools. If the answer is "yes," the 
Court must decide whether denying an exemption to schools whose 
racial discrimination is based on religious belief violates the 
First Amendment. If the answer is "no," the Court must decide 
whether giving an exemption to racially-discriminatory schools 
constitutes state action in support of private discrimination in 
violation of the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 
82-195, Mueller v. Allen 
This Establishment Clause case involves the constitutional-
ity of tuition tax credits. Minnesota permits income tax deduc-
~ .... --
ti ons for school tuition, textbook, and transportation expendi-------- ------....... tures up to a specified maximum. Apparently much of the benefit 
goes to parents who send their children to private sectarian 
schools. The CA8 upheld the statute. There is a direct conflict 
with the CAl. The basic issue is whether the statute has the 
"primary effect" of advancing religion. The Court's decision 
will have a crucial and perhaps dispositive impact on the tuition 
tax credit proposals now under serious consideration in Congress. 
# 
.,. 
, 2 • 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, No. 81-1064 
The issue here involves the propriety of a federal court 
injunction barring the Los Angeles Police Department from using 
"control holds" or "strangleholds" in circumstances not threatening 
death or bodily harm. Lyons, a motorist, brought a §1983 suit after 
being stopped for a minor traffic violation. The CA9 justified the 
injunction on the ground that the alleged constitutional violation 
was capable of repetition yet evading review. 
There are two principal issues: (1) standing or mootness; and 
(2) federalism. It is a significant question whether plaintiff has 
standing to request a federal court to enjoin a municipal police 
department from using particular force techniques against him and 
others when he is not specifically threatened; has a remedy for 
damages; and represents only himself. It is also questionable 
whether a federal court may issue an injunction where it 
substantially interferes with a police department's policies 
concerning use of force and where it significantly controls the 
department's training and reporting of force use. 
mfs 04/30/83 C/i11 ~ 




Eleventh Circuit Jud1ci~n-0e , 
Attached is a rough draft of a discussion on stays in 
capital cases. I have written it as though it were part of a 
speech on the Court's work this Term in general. I have included 
footnotes for your benefit. Without the footnotes, the text is 
just under three pages long. 
The library has been unable to locate the article by 
Prof. Amsterdam that you have heard discussed. He gave a speech 
in 1977 against the death penalty, and he wrote a book about de-
fending er iminal cases in general. Neither of these is at all 
like what you described. JUSTICE REHNQUIST has also heard about 
this Amsterdam article, and one of his clerks was also unable to 
find it. 
locate it? 
Do you have any more information that might help us 
1tt; ~/j/(/IJ 
rough dra ~s-~f 
Capital Cases b'f ~ ~ {) 
1 
l'?X' 5, 
The death penalty continues to occupy the Court. Four 
capital cases in which we have heard oral argument are now pend-
ing,1 and we already have agreed to hear a fifth next Term. 2 My 
particular concern, however, is with a different type of case. 
So far this Term we have received 28 stay applications involving 
the death penalty, and half of these have come at the eleventh 
hour. 3 I will discuss one of these--a case with which some of 
you are already familiar--as an example of the problem. 
I 
In 1977 an Alabama jury found John Louis Evans III 
guilty of murder, and the state court sentenced him to die. Ev-
ans spent the next 2 years seeking direct review of his convic-
tion, and then 3 1/2 years on federal habeas. 4 Shortly after the 
1zant v. Stephens, No. 81-89 (argued last Term); California 
v. Ramos, No. 81-1893 (argued Feb. 22); Barclay v. Florida, No. 
81-6908 (argued Mar. 30); Barefoot v. Estelle, No. 82-6080 (ar-
gued Apr. 26). Stephens and Barclay, of course, should be par-
ticularly familiar to CAll. 
2Pulley v. Harris, No. 82-1095 (cert. granted Mar. 21) (ne-
cessity of proportionality review). 
3These figures have been supplied by Katey Downs in the 
Clerks Office. I have counted a case as an "eleventh hour" ap-
plication if it is filed here within one week of the scheduled 
execution date. Katey informs me that there are a handful of 
attorneys who are responsible for the truly "last minute" 
filings. In most of the cases in the "eleventh hour" category, 
however, the attorneys appear to have been blameless. Often they 
sought stays in the lower courts in timely fashion, but the lower 
courts did not act on their requests until shortly before the 
execution was scheduled. 
4I thought it best not to review the procedural history in 
any detail here. Not only is it long, it might be somewhat em-
barrassing for the CAll judges who were reversed 9-0 in Hopper v. 
Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982). 
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completion of the federal habeas proceeding, in October 1982, the 
State sought an order setting an execution date. Evans then 
moved for a new sentencing hearing. On February 18, 1983, the 
Alabama Supreme Court denied this motion, and on April 8, 1983, 
it scheduled the execution for April 22 at 12:01 a.m. 
Evans made no effort to obtain a stay of his execution 
until April 19--a full two months after his motion for a new sen-
tencing hearing was denied. Late that evening5 he sought a stay 
from me as Circuit Justice. His application reached my chambers 
f i.J;; s t.. tRJ..n~ in the morning on April 20--only 40 hours before his 
scheduled execution time. 
The two days we had available were hectic indeed. For-
tunately the Alabama Attorney General was able to file a response 
later that ~ g and one of my law clerks dropped all of his 
other work for two days to help me on this case. By the end of 
the second day, I was satisfied that Evans did not meet the 
Court's standards for a stay. 
tion. 
I therefore denied his applica-
Within an hour, Evans had filed a new habeas petition 
and a request for a stay in the Southern District of Alabama. 
Chief Judge Hand, who had acted on Evans' first petition, was 
5The application was received by the police officer at the 
door at 8:54 p.m. We had been warned to expect the application 
earlier that afternoon, and Evans had already filed his cert 
petn, so Mark was able to begin work on the case before we re-
ceived the actual application. 
Earlier that day Evans had requested a stay from the Alabama 
Supreme Court. This request was promptly denied. 
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unavailable, so the case was assigned to Judge Cox. Less than 
three hours before the scheduled execution, Judge Cox realized 
that he did not have sufficient time to evaluate the case, so he 
granted a temporary stay. 
asked us 
with the 
Early the next morning the Alabama Attorney General 
Since we were already familiar 
able to determine--after a third 
to vacate that stay. 
situation, we were 
day's work--that the latest claims were meritless. 
granted the Attorney General's request. 
Thus we 
II 
There can be no doubt that a prisoner has a right to 
meaningful review of his federal claims in a federal habeas pro-
ceeding. Denial of a stay may make meaningful review impossible. 
But it is also clear that the State has a strong interest in the 
orderly administration of justice. 
abuse the judicial process in an 
sentence. 
A prisoner has no right to 
attempt to postpone a lawful 
In Barefoot v. Estelle, 6 a case argued last month, we 
are considering the appropriate standards for lower courts to 
apply in deciding whether to stay an execution. Barefoot, howev-
er, is in the context of a timely application in an initial babe-
as proceeding. Evans illustrates the more serious problem of 
last minute applications in subsequent habeas proceedings. Evans 
had already spent 3 1/2 years on federal habeas, but he did not 
6No. 82-6080 (argued Apr. 26). 
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raise his final issue until hours before his scheduled execution. 
He did not raise this issue before the Alabama Supreme Court in 
his motion for a new sentencing hearing, he did not call it to my 
attention in his initial application for a stay, and he did not 
seek federal habeas relief during the two months after the Ala-
bama Supreme Court's decision. 
It is impossible to declare a blanket rule that will 
apply in every proceeding. But I call your attention to an order 
entered by Chief Judge Hand7 in Evans' initial habeas proceeding. 
Concerned with the threat of piecemeal litigation, he declared: 
[T] his Court hereby directs that counsel for [Evans] 
has five days _ ••• in which to amend [the habeas] peti-
tion to aver [each and every ground ••• that can be as-
serted ••• to attack the constitutionality of the Ala-
bama death statute or the incarceration of John Louis 
Evans III. If counsel • • • declines to follow [this 
order] ••• they will thereby be presumed to have delib-
erately waived the rights to ~ny such proceedings on 
any such actions in the future. J 
Al though such an order may not always be ef feet ive, it should 
encourage the orderly disposition of habeas claims. And it 
should put the parties on notice that the federal courts will not 
tolerate an abuse of the judicial process. 
7chief Judge Hand is the DJ who attempted to overrule the 
Court on the school prayer issue. You stayed his judgment in 
Jaffree v. Board of School Cornrn'rs, No. A-663. I assume he will 
be happy to hear that you approve of some of his actions. 
8ynpublished order of April 20, 1979 (reprinted in App. 55, 
Hopper v. Evans, O.T. 1981, 80-1714). I have done some editing 
to make the order more appropriate for your speech. 
,. 
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL ¾_ 
From: Mark 
Re: "Big" Cases of this Year 
(1) Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, and Bob 
Jones University v. United States (Nos. 81-1, 81-3, NOT YET DE-
CIDED) -- Whether it violates the Internal Revenue Code or the 
Fifth Amendment to provide tax-exempt status to racially dis-
criminatory private schools, and whether it violates the First 
Amendment to deny tax-exempt status to religious schools that 
discriminate on the basis of race. 
(2) Illinois v. LaFayette (No. 81-1859, NOT YET DECIDED) --
Whether the police may conduct an inventory search, at the police 
station, of a shoulder bag carried by an arrested person. 
(3) Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Commission 
(No. 81-1945, decided April 20, 1983) -- A state may impose a 
moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants because of 
its concern about the economic uncertainties with respect to the 
problem of long-term waste disposal. 
(4) Jones v. United States (No. 81-5195, NOT YET DECIDED) --
Whether a criminal defendant who was committed to a mental hospi-
tal after being found not guilty by reason of insanity must be 
released once he has been confined for a period longer than he 
could have served in prison if convicted. 
job 05/07/83 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Mike told me that you wanted each of us to prepare a list of 
the important cases that we have worked on this Term. My list would 
include: 
1. Dirks v. SEC, No. 82-276. The issue presented by this case 
is whether a securities analyst may be censured for disclosing in-
formation that was communicated to him by company employees. The 
SEO-brought this action under Rule l0b-5 against an analyst who re-
ceived a tip, but disclosed the fraud after conducting an independ-
ent investigation of that tip. The Court in this case will define 
an insider's duty to disclose or abstain before trading in his cor-
poration's securities and the duties that tippees assume. 
2. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, No. 
81-2338. This case presents the issue whether a charitable tax ex-
emption is unconstitutional when it applies to lobbying for veter-
ans' groups but not TRW. The case presents both an interesting 1st 
A issue and the more obvious equal protection question. 
3. Mueller v. Allen, No. 82-195. This is a major Establish-
ment Clause case that will determine the constitutionality of tu-
ition tax deductions for school expenses. Because the deduction 
obviously benefits parents with children in private schools more 
than those with children in public schools, the question is whether 
the fact that over 95% of the private schools are parochial makes 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Rives 
Re: Cases during this Term 
Mike said that you wanted us to list the three or four 
most interesting cases that we worked on this Term. The three cases 
that are of interest to me are as follows (none of these cases has 
been handed down): 
1. No. 80-1832, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha--In 
addition to numerous threshold issues, this case presents the 
question whether Congress may veto, either by a vote of one or both 
Houses, an agency's actions. The question can be analyzed in two 
ways. If the veto is seen as a legislative act, then the question 
is whether Congress may take legislative action in a way that does 
not comply with the procedures established in the Presentation 
Clause--passage of a bill by both Houses and presentation to the 
President. Alternatively, if the veto is seen as an adjudicative 
act, the question is whether it violates separation-of-powers 
principles for Congress--which is not subject to procedural 
constraints or review--to adjudicate one person's rights. 
• 
'\ 2. No. 82-52, Arizona Governing Council v. Norris--In Los Angeles 
v. Manhart, the Court held that an employer-provided pension plan 
may not use sex-based tables to calculate the cost of providing an 
annuity. Manhart, noted, however, that Congress did not intend to 
revolutionize the insurance industry and that its holding did not 
prevent private insurance companies from relying on sex-based 
tables. Norris presents the question whether an employer violates 
Title VII by making an annuity, offered by a private insurance 
company and calculated using sex-based tables, available to its 
employees. 
2. 
3. No. 82-185, Boston Firefighters Union v. Boston Chapter, NAACP--
Although the Court will not reach the merits on this case, it poses 
the difficult question of how the rights of minority workers--who 
are not identifiable victims of discrimination--are to be weighed 
against the seniority rights of nonminority workers. 
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